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This is a response to “Retraction Note: Can Two-Way Direct Communication Protocols Be Con-
sidered Secure? Mladen Pavicˇic´,” Nanoscale Research Letters, 14, 242 (2019). The “anonymised”
report which served the editors to retract the paper is reproduced in full. A response to the report
by the author of the original paper, sent to the editors of the journal, is also reproduced in full. The
author analyses and discusses both the report and the retraction note and explains why he cannot
agree to the retraction.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac, 42.50.Ex
I. INTRODUCTION
The editors of the Nanoscale Research Letters recently
published the following Retraction Note:
“Retraction Note: Can Two-Way Direct Communication
Protocols Be Considered Secure?”
Nanoscale Research Letters, 14, 242 (2019)
https://doi.org/10.1186/s11671-019-3086-8
The editors have retracted this article [1] because after
publication concerns were raised regarding the validity
of the conclusions drawn. Post-publication peer review
has revealed a flaw in the application of the key rate
equation r = IAB − IAE . For calculation of the term
IAE , the effect of disturbance (D) on both the message
mode (MM) and control mode (CM) was not taken into
account. The main claim of the paper cannot be reliably
reached. The author does not agree to this retraction.
1. Pavicˇic´, M. (2017), Can Two-Way Direct Communi-
cation Protocols Be Considered Secure? Nanoscale Res.
Lett. 12:552.
Reportedly, the editors decided to obtain a post-
publication peer review report of the original article that
then served them to retract the article. The report is
given in Sec. II.
II. ANONYMISED REPORT
The original article deals with the ping-pong proto-
col. These type of protocols were originally sold as a way
to distribute secret keys directly (without the need for
two-way communication involving error correction and
privacy amplification), but it is by now widely recognized
in the community that this was not a useful direction.
Hence, the author of the article, and also the authors
∗ mpavicic@irb.hr
of the comment on that article, treat the protocol as
a specific form of a QKD protocol, which performs er-
ror correction and privacy amplification after the initial
exchange of quantum signals and subsequent measure-
ments.
I fully agree with the comments made by the com-
ment authors [1–3]. The author of the original arti-
cle [4] misunderstood the origin of the key rate formula
r = IAB − IAE . (Note that the security definitions
changed since the late 1990s, and we would not write
this type of formula anymore.) But for the sake of argu-
ment, let’s stick to the old notions: The information is
always the information on the raw data. And while IAB
directly comes from the observed error rate of the raw
data (disturbance D of the message mode (MM)) in this
case, the term IAE needs to be calculate from all avail-
able constraints, including the disturbance in the MM
and also the control mode CM.
For the given Man-in-the-middle attack, we would
create no disturbance in the MM mode, but full distur-
bance (random outcome) in the CM mode. Therefore,
one would conclude that IAB = 1 (no disturbance in
the MM mode) and also IAE = 1, since the disturbance
of CM shows that Eve could have performed the attack,
thus obtain all signal, and thus the key rate would be zero
for this attack. This is contained in the security analy-
ses of these protocols. For smaller disturbance rate, the
key rate turns positive, utilizing the privacy amplification
method. Again, we are doing QKD here, where privacy
amplification is allowed...
I will not go in more detail on the discussion be-
tween the author [5] of the article [4] and the authors of
the comment [1–3] regarding the question whether this
particular attack is covered in the original security proofs.
Only that much: of course the SWAP operation is a valid
interaction of Eve with the signal, and thus should be
covered by the original security proofs, as long as those
security proofs also allowed a coherent quantum mechan-
ical interaction between ancilla and the signal on both
directions, just as the authors of the comment pointed
out. The paragraph in the reply to the comment (page
23) [5] is a mystery to me.
What happens if Eve attacks only a fraction of the
signals with that particular attack? Yes, no error cor-
rection needed (IAE = 1) and from the disturbance D
in the CM mode one can prove that Eve does not learn
more than a fraction f of the messages, so IAE = f . As
a result, the key rate would be r = 1 − f . Of course we
don’t need to know which bits Eve knows and which she
does not know. Privacy amplification can take care of it,
similar as how it takes care of signals that Eve could have
learned from multi-photon signals in weak coherent pulse
QKD. There she also learns a fraction of signals, and Al-
ice and Bob don’t know where those bits are located in
the raw key, and still can distill a secret key.
Note that in his response to the comment the au-
thor alludes to ’the exponential loss in fiber’, appar-
ently thinking that this loss, as with multi-photon sig-
nals, might eventually allow Eve to make sure that only
signals where she knows the outcome remain in the raw
data. However, that does not work in the particular case.
Eve could not prevent Alice and Bob form performing
the CM part of the protocol, hiding that part in the loss.
Eve cannot distinguish between CM and MM signals, and
thus cannot selectively suppress one or the other (quite
in contrast to multi-photon signals in WCP BB84). Note
that no corresponding argument is made in the original
article, though there are remarks made, such as on page
3, right column:
Here, it should be stressed that photons in LM05
cover twice the distance they cover in BB84. So, if the
probability of a photon to be detected over only Bob-
Alice distance is p, the probability of being detected over
Bob-Alice-Bob distance will be p2 and Eve would be able
to hide herself in CM exponentially better than in BB84.
I cannot follow that logic. As said before, there is
no handle for Eve to suppress signals selectively in CM
mode. The author does not give a clear way how this
attack angle could be exploited. (And I am sure there
isn’t any way to exploit it.)
I am afraid that the author misunderstood the se-
curity framework that stands behind the formula r =
IAB − IAE in a fundamental way, and thus that his con-
clusions are deeply flawed and invalid in a very apparent
way.
III. AUTHOR’S RESPONSE TO THE REPORT
The whole report is busy with r = IAB − IAE . It
claims (2nd paragraph from the bottom) - when Eve at-
tacks only a fraction of signals - that (a) IAB = 1 (she/he
writes IAE , but this is a misprint) and (b) “from the dis-
turbance D in the CM (control mode) Eve does not learn
more than a fraction f of the messages, so IAE = f . As
a result, the key rate would be r = 1−f .” Then it claims
that I did not take all that into account and that I mis-
understood r = IAB − IAE .
But in Fig. 5(b), on p. 4 of [4], I plotted IAE(D),
stressing that “D is the disturbance in the CM (control
mode).” Also, in Conclusions, p. 5, last paragraph of [4]
“Eve induces a disturbance (D) only in the control mode
(CM) and therefore the standard approach and proto-
cols for estimating and calculating the security are not
available since they all assume the presence of D in MM
(message mode).”
Yet, the referee claims immediately afterwards that
“we don’t need to know which bits Eve knows and which
she does not know. Privacy amplification (PA) can take
care of it.”
But PA for the considered attack has never been ex-
plicitly calculated. And on p. 5, left column, bottom and
right column, top of [4] I write: ”The only procedure we
are left with to establish the security is the privacy am-
plification. When Eve possesses just a fraction of data,
she will loose trace of her bits and Alice and Bob’s ones
will shrink. Eve might be able to recover data by guess-
ing the bits she misses and reintroduces all bits again in
the hash function. If unsuccessful, her information will
be partly wiped away. However, Alice and Bob meet a
crucial problem with designing their security procedure
(e.g., hash function) which would guarantee that Eve is
left with no information about the final key. They do
not have a critical amount of Eve’s bits” which would
tell them at which D in the CM they have to abort the
transmission, and this is the main conclusion of my pa-
per.
So, the “explanation” of the forceful retraction is
nonsensical: “peer review has revealed a flaw in the ap-
plication of the key rate equation r = IAB − IAE . For
calculation of the term IAE , the effect of disturbance (D)
on both the message mode (MM) and control mode (CM)
was not taken into account.”
IV. DISCUSSION
We all agree that
(i) There is no disturbance (D) in the message mode
(MM), only in the control mode (CM);
(ii) Under the man-in-the-middle attack we always have
IAB = 1 and therefore LM05 protocol, “in effect,
[amounts to] sending plain text via MM secured by
occasional verification of photon states in CM” [4,
p. 5, right column, 2nd paragraph];
(iii) The only available procedure to sift out Eve’s bits
is the privacy amplification.
There are two disagreements, though.
1. The editors, the anonymised referee, and the au-
thors of [1–3] claim that something is wrong and
deeply flawed with the way I handle r = IAB − IAE
but they do not say what is wrong. They only say
(see Sec. I) that “the effect of disturbance (D) on
3both the message mode (MM) and control mode
(CM) was not taken into account.” But there is no
D in MM, as we all agree, and in Fig. 5(b) of [4]
I plot IAE(D), i.e., IAE as a function of D in CM.
Hence, the accusation is void and unscientific.
2. The anonymised referee writes in his report above:
“from the disturbance D in the CM mode one can
prove that Eve does not learn more than a fraction
f of the messages, so IAE = f . As a result, the
key rate would be r = 1 − f . Of course we don’t
need to know which bits Eve knows and which she
does not know. Privacy amplification can take care
of it, similar as how it takes care of signals that
Eve could have learned from multi-photon signals
in weak coherent pulse QKD. There she also learns
a fraction of signals, and Alice and Bob don’t know
where those bits are located in the raw key, and
still can distill a secret key.”
The problem with this is that the referee does not
tell us how “privacy amplification can take care of
it.” When Eve is in the line all the time (D =
0.5), then privacy amplification obviously does not
work since then Bob-Alice’s key and Eve’s key are
identical and Eve’s bits cannot be distilled out. So,
is it feasible for D = 0.499? Or for D = 0.3? Or
for D = 0.2? Or for D = 0.11? Has anyone carried
out such an analysis? No one to my knowledge.
And that is why the main point of my paper is, as
I stressed in my response above, that we do not have a
procedure “which would tell Alice [and Bob] at which D
in the CM they have to abort the transmission, and this
is the main conclusion of my paper.”
Consequently, I cannot agree to this unfounded, un-
scientific, and rather Kafkian [6] retraction.
I put together all this as a service to community and
readers.
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